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Case Notes
The Right of the Prosecutor to Advance
Notice of the Defendant's Alibi Defense
INTRODUCTION
In November, 1974, the Supreme Court of California, In Bank,
handed down a decision in the case of Reynolds v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County.' Robert Reynolds had been charged with
kidnapping, rape, drugging, sexual molestation, and attempted
murder of a ten year-old girl. He was also accused of furnishing
drugs to four of his step-daughters (who were minors), and of
sexually molesting one of these children. Prior to trial, the supe-
rior court issued a discovery order at the request of the prosecut-
ing attorney. This order directed Reynolds to give a three day
warning to the prosecution before calling any alibi witnesses.
This notice was directed to contain the names and addresses of
alibi witnesses that the defense intended to call at trial. In turn,
the prosecuting attorney was directed to supply Reynolds with
any evidence he obtained, or already had in his possession, which
impeached the alibi witnesses. The order further provided for the
exclusion at trial of any evidence or testimony that did not comply
with this order.
In line with his belief that the court lacked the authority to
issue such an order, Reynolds petitioned the California Supreme
Court for relief. The court agreed to grant relief saying:
We have determined that the superior court erred in issuing its
notice-of-alibi order, and herewith issue our peremptory writ of
prohibition restraining the enforcement of that order.2
CRIMINAL DIscOVERY IN CALIFORNIA
In order to see the effect and significance of this decision, a
short summary of California criminal discovery law will be ben-
eficial. The law in this area is almost totally a creation of the
1. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
2. Id. at 837, 528 P.2d at 46, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
courts.3 In People v. Riser,4 the court allowed the defendant lib-
eral discovery against the prosecution, The court stated that:
[a]bsent some governmental requirement that information be
kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement,
the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evi-
dence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular
it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who
have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly
impeached as the evidence permits. To deny flatly any right of
production on the ground that an imbalance would be created
between the advantages of prosecution and defense would be to
lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertain-
ment of the facts.5
In Jones v. Superior Court,6 the California Supreme Court an-
nounced that discovery was not a "one-way street", and extended
discovery privileges to the prosecution so long as the defendant's
constitutional rights were not violated. Just what these rights are,
has troubled and confused the court ever since.
In Jones, the defendant was charged with rape, and made it
known prior to trial that his defense was a claim of impotence.
Upon learning of this development, the prosecuting attorney mo-
tioned to discover the evidence that would support this claim. The
court rejected some items which the prosecution had requested
but stated that:
The prosecution . . . is entitled to discover the names of the
witnesses petitioner intends to call and any reports and X-rays
he intends to introduce in evidence in support of his particular
affirmative defense of impotence.7
The basis for this decision was that the defendant was going to
disclose the information anyway, so, by merely making him do so
at an earlier time, none of his rights were violated.8
Justice Peters vehemently dissented, arguing that discovery
should be a "one-way street" and the defendant had a constitu-
tional right to remain silent and wait until after the State had
presented its case before selecting his defense.
The push for more and broader prosecutorial discovery in Cali-
fornia went on for several years and eventually reached its outer
limit in People v. Pike.0 In this case, the court approved an order
3. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Section 271 (1963).
4. 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956) (overruled on other grounds);
People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
5. Id. at 586, 305 P.2d at 13.
6. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
7. Id. at 61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
8. Id.
9. 71 Cal. 2d 595, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969).
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that required the defense to supply the names and addresses and
expected testimony of defense witnesses.
The liberal prosecutorial discovery rule set forth in Pike was
short-lived. It was rejected in Prudhomme v. Superior Court,10
and a new rule was espoused. This new rule also limited the hold-
ing in Jones. The test in Prudhomme is that there can be no pros-
ecutorial discovery unless the trial court finds that the information
requested cannot possibly lighten the burden of the prosecution in
proving its case-in-chief. In other words, no discovery unless the
information cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the
defendant."
THE PROBLEM WITH PRUDHOMME
The Prudhomme case would seem to have set out a standard for
California courts that would severely restrict, if not totally de-
stroy, the prosecutor's right to discover an alibi in advance of its
introduction by the defense at trial. But, the manner in which
Prudhomme was decided, coupled with a United States Supreme
Court decision only three months later, clouded the issue again.
The Prudhomme court based much of its rationale on the idea
of an increased awareness by the United States Supreme Court
for the constitutional rights of defendants. It points out that at
the time Jones was decided, the 5th Amendment right against self-
incrimination did not apply to the states. It was not until Malloy
v. Hogan,12 that the protection of the 5th Amendment was held to
bind other than federal tribunals. While declining to overrule
Jones, Prudhomme limits the case "virtually to its facts."'18 It then
implies a prediction that the U. S. Supreme Court, which was
studying a Florida notice-of-alibi statute, will declare the statute
unconstitutional.' 4 To the contrary, the U. S. Supreme Court up-
held the statute in Williams v. Florida.15
10. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 ('1970).
11. Id. at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
12. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. LOUISELL AND WALLY, MODERN CALIFORNIA DIscovERY, at 895 (2d
ed. 1972).
14. For an expanded discussion of this point see Kane, Criminal Dis-
covery-The Circuitous Road to a Two-Way Street, 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 203
(1973) [hereinafter cited Kane].
15. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
In Williams, the Court found no constitutional problem with the
Florida statute which set out reciprocal discovery rights in a fair
and just manner. The Court pointed out that if the defense "sup-
rised" the prosecution with an alibi witness at trial, the prosecu-
tion would certainly be allowed a continuance in order to check
the veracity of the alibi. Therefore, all the defendant was forced
to do was accelerate the time when he must state his defense. The
Court concluded that this did not force the defendant to incriminate
himself. The Court cited the Jones case as one basis for its decision.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Black deplored the majority's in-
fringement of 5th Amendment guarantees. In particular, he at-
tempted to show the error of the majority in relying on Jones. He
decried the dangerous implicatons of the Jones theory. 16
Of course, one very significant difference between California
and Florida is that the former does not have a notice-of-alibi stat-
ute while the latter does have one. The importance of this was
recognized in Reynolds.
But, just as important, the Supreme Court of California had
placed itself in the position of all but overruling Jones, a case that
the U. S. Supreme Court placed great importance on in deciding
Williams only three months later. The effect of this was to con-
fuse the area of prosecutorial discovery in California.
THE CONFUSION AFTER PRUDHOMME AND WILLIAMS
After Prudhomme, there have been two courts of appeal deci-
sions on discovery of alibi. One was decided in the First District
and the other in the Second District. Not surprisingly, the two
courts came to opposite conclusions based on similar fact patterns.
rn People v. Hall,'7 the defendant was accused of selling heroin.
His offer of alibi at trial, was not allowed because of his failure
to comply with a discovery order which demanded that he dis-
close his alibi witnesses in advance. While purporting to follow
Prudhomme, the court distinguished this case because the order
here was narrow and specific, while the order in Prudhomme was
broad and sweeping.' It appears that the court downplayed Prud-
homme in light of the Williams decision.
In Rodriguez v. Superior Court,19 the defendant was charged
16. Id. at 114-15.
17. 7 Cal. App. 3d 562, 86 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970) (disapproved on other
grounds); People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313
(1972).
18. Id. at 566-67, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
19. 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1970).
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with murder and burglary. Before the jury was selected, the judge
ordered the defense to supply the prosecution with a list of alibi
witnesses that would be called. Again, it looks as if the court was
downplaying Prudhomme. Here, however, a different court of
appeal went the opposite direction from Hall.
The defendant sought a writ of prohibition denying the pros-
ecutors the right to the names of the alibi witnesses. The court
of appeal issued the writ saying that an innovation such as re-
quiring defendants to give advance notice of alibis, should be
undertaken by the legislature and not by the courts. It also stated
that the Prudhomme test had not been applied by the trial court,
so the discovery order would also fail on that count.
AN END To THE CONFUSION
In Reynolds, the California Supreme Court immediately notes
the conflict between the two courts of appeal decisions based on
similiar facts. While still upholding the validity of the "two-way
street" idea of Jones, the court agrees with Rodriguez that a notice-
of-alibi order is best left to the legislature to set out in statute
form.
It has been argued by many that such a discovery statute is not
necessary. In fact, one writer asserts that the result reached in
Rodriguez, and therefore by implication the result reached in Rey-
nolds, is, perhaps, not permitted by the decision in Williams. This
position is based on the premise that the only impediment to pros-
ecutorial discovery was the federal constitutional requirement
against self-incrimination. Once this problem was removed in
Williams, the state has an affirmative duty to develop rules of dis-
covery which apply to both the prosecution and the defense. The
author argues that the manner in which the defendant is required
to give up the names of his alibi witnesses, whether by judicial or
legislative rule, is unimportant. The important thing is that one
of the two branches of state government perform the duty.2 0
THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
The court considers such arguments in Reynolds, but points out
that California, in addition to the federal standard, has its own
20. Kane, supra n. 14 at 214.
protection against self-incrimination. 21  Therefore, Williams sets
the outer limits but in no way precludes a state court from apply-
ing tighter restrictions based on its own constitution. 22 The Rey-
nolds court approvingly cites Scott v. State,23 an Alaska Supreme
Court decision, to show its inclination:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards
imposed upon us by the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are
under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and priv-
ileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental
rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our
local constitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of
civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our
constitutional heritage. We need not stand by idly and passively,
waiting for constitutional direction from the highest court in the
land. Instead, we should be moving concurrently to develop and
expound the principles embedded in our constitutional law.24
The court in Reynolds states that from Prudhomme on, it has
shown its concern for the possible self-incrimination of defendants
if they are required to give names and notice of alibis in advance.
Therefore, while declining to go as far as the Alaska court did in
holding all notice-of-alibi orders unconstitutional, it states that
without a statute, court mandated notice-of-alibi orders will not be
upheld.
In declining to uphold such orders, the court points out the differ-
ence between prescribing judicial procedures necessary to protect
a fundamental constitutional principle or right, and the prescribing
of judicial procedures which are not required by either the State
or Federal Constitutions. In the first instance, it is under a duty
to make rules. But, while conceding that court authorization of
the latter procedures may be permitted by the two constitutions
and may also be socially desirable in many instances, the court
points out that such procedures are better left to the legislature
to formulate. Because prosecutorial discovery is not a fundamen-
tal constitutional right, the court leaves the institution of such a
procedure to the legislature.
THE EFFECT OF WARDIUS IN CALIFORNIA
In order to deny the right of the prosecution to discovery of
alibis, the court in Reynolds must deal with Wardius v. Oregon.25
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (West 1974).
22. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 842, 528 P.2d 45, 49,
117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 441 (1974).
23. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
24. Id. at 783.
25. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
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This case represents an indication by the U.S. Supreme Court that
notice-of-alibi rules may more properly be judged on due process
grounds, rather than on self-incrimination grounds. In Wardius,
Oregon had a statute which required the defendant to disclose his
alibi in advance. The Court emphasized the "two-way street" ap-
proach of Jones and Williams and declined to uphold the Oregon
statute because of an absence of reciprocal discovery rights for the
defendant. The Court said:
It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the
details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him
to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces
of evidence which he disclosed to the State.26
At first blush, it would seem that the order in Reynolds meets
this reciprocity requirement. The superior court couched its dis-
covery order in terms it thought would meet the Wardius test.2 7
However, the California Supreme Court held that the order failed
to meet the Wardius standard for the following two reasons:
[f]irst, the order does not require the prosecution to furnish ...
[defendant] . . . with the names and addresses of the witnesses
... [the prosecution] . . . will put on in rebuttal to . . . [de-
fendant's] . . . alibi defense. Second, the order does not require
the prosecution to name with all possible specificity the time and
place of the alleged crimes as to which ... [defendant] ...
might offer alibis. 28
While the court concedes that reciprocity may indeed be met
here, it points out the fact that it is also possible that reciprocity
will not be extended. The order may turn out to be a tool that
gives the prosecution an unfair advantage. The California Supreme
Court's inability to ascertain all the circumstances surrounding the
lower court's original discovery order, coupled with the lack of
predictability as to whether the defendant would be given his re-
ciprocal rights, is the key to the lack of due process. For example,
if Reynolds had complied with the order and then asked for the
name of a rebuttal witness, there is no guarantee that the lower
court would compel the prosecution to give up that information.
Without such a guarantee, which the court says can only be given
26. Id. at 476.
27. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 843, 528 P.2d 45, 51,
117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 443 (1974).
28. Id. at 844, 528 P.2d at 51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
by statute, no prosecutorial discovery will be allowed. Thus, the
California Supreme Court is telling the lower courts of California
not to attempt to meet the Wardius test. The court is saying that
all such attempts will be overruled, at least until the orders are
based on a statute.
WHAT DID THE DISCOVERY ORDER MEAN?
The California Supreme Court states that one reason that it will
require a statute is the great possibility of ambiguity when court
ordered discovery is allowed. This possibility is shown vividly in
Reynolds, where, as stated above, the superior court attempted to
apply the Wardius test in ordering the disclosure of alibis. Both
counsel agreed to the text of the order as amplified orally by the
judge. But, on appeal, their respective interpretations as to what
they had agreed to were radically different. Defense counsel
stressed the limited language of the order as recorded by the court,
while the prosecution argued the superior court's orally expressed
attempt to comply with Wardius. It is submitted that this shows
the possibility for abuse and mis-interpretation that is inherent
when a tightly drawn statute is not in use.
THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION IN THIS AREA
The California Supreme Court claims to draw no inference from
the fact that notice-of-alibi legislation has repeatedly failed to be
passed by the California legislature.29 While this may be so, it is
worth noting the attitude of the court of appeal in Rodriguez:
But there is not merely the absence of a relevant statute in
California. There has been a definite rejection of notice-of-alibi
legislation. A rather elaborate statutory plan was recommended
by the California Law Revision Commission and considered by
the legislature in 1961, but was rejected .... Earlier bills had
been introduced in 1959 . . . , and as far back as 1926 .... 30
The court then sums up a judicial attitude which this writer
feels can be read into the California Supreme Court decision in
Reynolds:
The doctrine of judicial abstention should persuade courts not
only to refrain from declaring statutes invalid except upon the
most cogent reasons but also to forebear from adopting new and
29. Id. at 847, 528 P.2d at 53, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 445. At least five such
bills have been introduced in the Legislature since 1959. This problem has
been debated in California legal circles at least since 1926.
30. Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 497, 88 Cal. Rptr.
154, 156 (1970).
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important procedural devices which the Legislature has consid-
ered and rejected.3 1
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that Reynolds has laid to rest for the present the
possibility of a prosecutor gaining advance knowledge as to the
alibis of defendants. Because the court again refused to flatly re-
ject Jones, some limited prosecutorial discovery is still permitted.
However, Reynolds certainly clears up much of the confusion in
this area.
The court has left open the possibility of a statute being enacted
that will allow alibi discovery. It is certainly valid to read this
case as a call for legislative action. But, it should be kept in mind
that even such a statute may be unconstitutional based on Article
1, Section 13 of the California Constitution.3 2
At any rate, until the enactment of such a statute, a defendant's




32. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (West 1974).
